

Imposition of Sanctions on North Korea by United States and Conflict of Denuclearization Agenda

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Abstract

The study examines the Imposition of sanctions on North Korea by United States and Conflict of Denuclearization Agenda. In order to ascertain whether the continuous coordinated imposition of sanctions by the Donald Trump and Joe Biden Presidency against North Korea undermines the adoption of a sustainable denuclearization agreement. The study adopted the 'Realist Theory' as its anchor blue-print in a pragmatic effort to explain why the engagement between the two states remain largely hostile. The study adopted content analysis for the purpose of analyzing documented materials generated through secondary sources of data collection as well as the qualitative method of data analysis. The findings show the serial and catastrophic worsening of United States and North Korea conflict which inadvertently undermines the denuclearization efforts in North Korea due to hostile operations by both the United States and North Korea Leaders. Recommendations were proffered along these findings as follows, the intensification of sanctions on individuals and businesses that has trans-border linkages with those in North Korea is rather not appropriate and counter-productive as it goes against the substantive goodwill the US internationally represents. The target of the United States is to denuclearize North Korea and not to punish the innocent citizens, which is against what the United Nations represents. This will go a long way in restoring the faith of North Korea and enhance the prospects of the denuclearization agenda.

Keywords

Imposition, Sanctions, United States, Conflict, Denuclearization, North Korea.

Introduction

The international political stage is clearly dominated by unapologetic state driven interests in a bid to expand individual state strategic capacity which invariably comes with obvious challenges of self- sufficiency in a world of scarcity, which have always pushed nations to interact across frontiers for the purpose of realizing their national interests which usually generate conflict of different proportions. The dynamics of these conflict have over the years turned out to be favourable to some countries, and unfavorable to other countries. The conflict

between the United States and the North Korea has had a fair share of both ends. In other words, the conflict between the United States (US) and the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) have been chequered since the declaration that brought the country to its status as an independent state by Kim Il-sung on September 9, 1948. This declaration was followed by a diplomatic recognition from the now defunct Soviet Union, which later became its major ally. The United States, however, did not recognize the independent status of the DPRK, which has strained and impacted on their conflict till date. Crabtree (2003) while explaining the reason for the non-recognition of the independent status of the DPRK by the United States stated that anti-American rhetoric of the past leaders of DPRK played a major role to limiting the American recognition. Hence, it could be said that America was responding to the existing historical precedence of “who is friends with America”. Resulting from the above, serious economic sanctions have been meted out to the DPRK under the Trading with Enemy Act till 2008, when the sanctions were temporarily relaxed (BBC report, 2008).

In a report by the Congressional Research Service (2020), it was rightly pointed that the inclinations of the DPRK to the proliferation of nuclear weapons as against the directives of the United States was one of the things that affected the conflict proportion between the two states. Resulting from the above, the United States adopted a foreign policy that prevented DPRK from trading with them, especially during the cold war. The United States considered the significant progress of DPRK’s nuclear program a threat, not just to the United States and its ally in the south (South Peninsula), but also to world peace and power balance, based on the foregoing the priority concern of every administration that emerges in the United States has been the issues of abating the nuclear programme of the DPRK.

The nuclear program of the DPRK have not been a hidden one since independence as the progenitor of the nation, Kim Il-Sung, found it germane as one of its elements of national powers. In the words of Kern (2018), the nuclear programme of the DPRK could be traced to the 1950s when it secured some level of nuclear technology from the Soviet Union. The country, due to its nuclear proliferation agenda, has received international condemnation, which in any way has not affected the productive capacity of the country in nuclear weapons. This program, according to Kern (2018), is seen as an instrument of enhancing international recognition among the comity of States, regime survival, source of national revenue, and also a source of reunifying the northern and southern Koreas.

The US and DPRK conflict have been hostile over seven decades and North Korea's perception of United States Government as a bias mediator in the Korean conflict has made attempts at improving the situation difficult. In 1976, two American soldiers engaged in routine tree-cutting exercise were annihilated by North Korean Army in the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the USG responded with a show of force that prompted an official apology from the North Korean regime (Gawthorpe, 1978). The non-compliance of DPRK to the nonproliferation standard has been another cause of struggle and strife between the United States and the DPRK. Just in 1994, the international inspectors sent to inquire into the adherence of the DPRK to the nonproliferation standard were blocked by the government of North Korea. Because of this, DPRK was accused of dispensation plutonium from a reactor to build two atomic bombs (Wampler, 2017). Wampler, (2017), while validating the proof of atomic processing in North Korea stated that a US OH-58 Kiowa helicopter was blasted by the North Korea's airspace, leading to the death of one pilot, while the other was held hostage for about 13 days in December 1994. Also, the Spanish troops with the American ship detained in North Korea as against the wishes of the United States government was another encounter that fuels the conflict existing between DPRK and United States in December 1994. The accusation of producing and distributing American dollars after the September 19 agreement in the late 2005, was another incidence that further exacerbated the conflict between the two states. It was estimated that about \$15 million worth of fake dollars were produced and distributed by DPRK through banks in Macau. While the USG during President George W. Bush administration failed to provide any official evidence to support its claim, an independent investigation and audit exonerated all the banks accused of being North Korea's collaborators (Mihm, 2006).

Various countries have a major bet in the Korean conflict but the US has been both the most vocal and directly involved foreign actor in the attempts to diplomatically resolve the conflict. The United States in their capacity as the global peace standard setter has been at the forefront to making sure that the nuclear program of the country does not grow and escalate beyond the normal so as not to constitute a threat to global peace and stability. This it hopes to achieve through the adoption of combined diplomatic processes and strategic pressures, although they have over the years proven to be counter-productive. Davenport (2020) is of the opinion that the nuclear program of DPRK has elicited international agreement among the comity of states to quell not just their proliferation intentions, but also their export of nuclear technology to other countries, which aid in the secret nuclearization of countries that are ally to the DPRK.

These seasons of confronting the nuclear program of DPRK have been opposed by serious stalemate, crises, and uncertain improvement towards denuclearization.

Davenport (2020) further posited that the government of the United States in a bid to curtail the nuclear program of the country has toe the direction of holistic economic sanctions, military co-operation with other allies in the region, none-proliferation sanctions among others in an attempt to reduce the proliferation agenda of the country. The United States Government has also used economic aid and relaxation of sanction as a tool of bargaining with North Korea. Following North Korea's announcement that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires non-nuclear weapons states to commit to not developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, the USG reached an agreement with North Korea in which the latter agreed to freeze its plutonium weapons program in exchange for aid. However, in 2002, this accord fell apart once more (Davenport, 2020). In August 2003, another round of diplomatic negotiation which involved six states (US, DPRK, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia) began. All these attempts at stooping the nuclear program of DPRK have sometimes met crises during negotiation, which ended up consolidating the conflict, while damping the reputation of DPRK among the comity of nations. Some level of successes was achieved in the nonproliferation agenda of the USG in 2005. The DPRK returned and agreed to a non-proliferation, and also pledged to abandon its nuclear agenda. This agreement was followed by a corresponding process by the six signatories to the agreement on ways to implement the 2005 pact in 2007 (Davenport, 2020). The deal, however, met its demise in 2009, following a dispute over verification and a rocket launch by North Korea that was denounced globally. According to Davenport (2020), North Korea's government threatened never to come back to the compromise board after the collapse of the 2005 agreement. Conflict between the US and DPRK remained hostile after the collapse of diplomatic agreement in 2009. The USG response to perceived acts of aggression of the North Korean government has mostly been imposition of sanctions and engagement in joint military drills with South Korean army in the Korean Peninsula which the DPRK regime considers as an act of provocation (Davenport, 2020).

During his campaign trail, President Donald Trump blamed the 'soft-handedness' of past US governments for North Korea's continuous expansion of its nuclear programme in addition to applying 'maximum pressure' on the regime to ditch its nuclear enrichment agenda if elected President of the United States (POTUS). Following his electoral victory and swearing-in as

POTUS, Donald Trump began a campaign of hard-line rhetoric against North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong-un (ABC News, 2017). He also threatened to engage in direct military attack against North Korea, but the DPRK's leader responded with his own hard line rhetoric and even threatened to launch an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) on US homeland. Within the first 3 months of the Trump government, North Korea conducted almost a dozen missile tests despite widespread criticism from the USG and her allies that included South Korea and Japan and in response, the Trump administration imposed harsher economic sanctions on individuals and corporations engaged in business dealings with North Korea (ABC News, 2017). Also, on 26th April 2017, the Trump administration briefed the US legislative body on its North Korea strategy, and President Trump's campaign promise of applying maximum campaign on North Korea as a means of forcing it to abandon its nuclear programme was reaffirmed during the briefing. By August of 2017, the US and DPRK were on the brink of war as the "fire and furry" agenda was suggested by Donald Trump against DPRK if they do not conform to the nonproliferation agenda and nuclear testing. Following these attempts by the United States government, North Korea responded with myriads of ballistic missiles against Guam and other USG allies in the region. Baker and Choe (2017) recorded that Japan and South Korea were major victims of the threat from DPRK as two powerful missiles were flown across their territory for nuclear testing. The full manifestations of threat from the USG were obvious in September 2017 during presidential speech in the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA), where the president endangered to entirely destroy North Korea if no other option exist for the USG but to defend its allies.

However, in a twist of plot, then Rex Tillerson, then US desk of State announced on 30th September 2017 that the USG and its North Korean counterpart were in direct contact and considering reopening diplomatic negotiation. After series of back-channel meetings of government officials of both countries, President Trump and Chairman Kim met on June 12 2018 in Singapore for their first direct talk. The talks achieved some level of success as it brought the DPRK to accept the nonproliferation treaty. This agreement marks a very historic shift as the conflict between the USG and the DPRK received some degree of temporary deactivation. This move was a welcome development as both countries declared their mutual partnership and friendship towards the maintenance of regional peace and stability. Following this, North Korea was expected to remove the anti-United States propaganda message in their country (Rosenfeld, 2018 & William, 2018).

After the Singapore summit, it did not take long for hostilities to resume between the US and DPRK as President Trump announced less than two weeks after the summit that the USG will maintain the sanctions against North Korea because the country still constituted an extraordinary danger to the US. It was said that the conflict was resurrected once more because of the accusation by North Korea of the United States' use of tactics assumed to be unilateral and gangster to facilitate and advocate for denuclearization. BBC News (2018) reported that the scheduled official visit of the US Secretary of State on August 2018 was cancelled on grounds of the president's acknowledgement of the weakened processes recorded so far about the denuclearization in North Korea.

Conflict between the US and DPRK continue to gain traction after the Singapore summit despite back-channel efforts to salvage the conflictual situation and additional face-to-face meetings between the POTUS and Chairman Kim in Hanoi and the De-Militarized Zone in 2019. With the DMZ summit on June 30 2019, President Trump assumed the first ever sitting American leader to visit North Korea. Despite these summits, denuclearization talks between the two countries have all ended in stalemate as the USG continues to accuse North Korea of lack of commitment to denuclearization and continuous acts of provocation. North Korea on its part has also repeatedly accused the US of inflexibility during negotiations. The lack of progress has regenerated tensions that may not only lead to total breakdown of the ongoing peace process, but could degenerate into full-scale war which would not only involve the United States and North Korea, but other regional actors like South Korea, China, and Japan. It is against this backdrop that this study investigates the United States-North Korea Conflict and the struggle for denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula between 2017 and 2023. It was on 3rd September, 2017 that the North Korea conducted by far its largest nuclear test and thus heightened the tension between the country and the United States under Trump's administration.

Literature Review

The efficacy of North Korean sanctions has been debated by a number of academics. Most researchers focused on analyzing member countries' committed measures and determining whether they were successfully implemented. Their obligations, however, chose a different technique to evaluating: 1) the goals and objectives of UNGA General Debate speeches reveals national agendas. 2) the growth of nuclear power, using qualitative facts to interpret the data results, despite being sanctioned, North Korea was able to produce weapons, 3) the weapons'

intended goals. Resolutions 1718 and 2270 of the United Nations Security Council were enforced on North Korea, and 4) an examination of the internal situation of the politics of the Six- Party Talks' member countries were conducted (Park & Walsh, 2016).

In the words of Park and Walsh (2016), one could ask whether the imposition of sanctions on a particular country is an effective most trusted way to inhibit their production in weapons of mass destruction. Following the above, one could also ask whether sanctions intend to reduce or halt the procurement of weapons of mass destruction. And lastly, one could ask whether the imposition of sanctions on North Korea generated a positive or negative outcome. However, following from the outcome of the sanctions, Park and Walsh (2016) posited that the North Korean leadership was able to dodge international sanctions by establishing state trading corporations (STCs) that were set up to buy both illicit and illegal items. Interviews with North Korean defectors who worked in the STCs were conducted over a three-year period. Their main goal was to capture "North Korean nuclear activities, partners, and routes in order to figure out how North Korea got around international sanctions (Park & Walsh, 2016).

Despite academic studies proving its ineffectiveness, more targeted international sanctions are being adopted now for the sake of nonproliferation, according to the report. This study presents the viewpoint of an STC manager entrusted with sanction evasion, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of implementing sanctions on North Korea. In the late 2000s, the study discovered a rise in the hiring of additional Chinese intermediaries to handle trade logistics. They also discovered that North Korean embassies were being utilized to buy large scale arms and ammunition (Park, Walsh 2016). The major themes explored in Gordon Friedrichs' Smart Security Council; Analyzing the *Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions* are sanction-effectiveness, sanction-implementation, and legitimacy. Through case studies of North Korea and Iran, Friedrichs utilizes legitimacy as a significant element in assessing the activities governments vowed to execute (to impose sanctions) (Friedrichs, 2013).

Despite the fact that we agree with the conclusions, we believe Friedrichs' is asking the incorrect questions. North Korea was able to progress its nuclear weapons program even as governments followed through on their promises. Critics can argue that North Korea could have built nuclear weapons faster without the sanctions; but, sanctions aimed at denuclearizing North Korea did not achieve the desired result. Instead of evaluating whether countries followed through on sanctions commitments, we looked into the intentions and

priorities of Six-Party Talks members by analyzing UNGA General Debate statements, the intended purpose of specific UNSC sanctions imposed on North Korea, and the nuclear weapons technology North Korea was able (or unable) to produce in spite of sanctions (Kim, 2017).

Prior to the 1950-1953 Korean War, the Korean cape was originally annexed by the Japanese in 1910, however, the war was a major incidence that led to the separation of the two divides. Accompanying the end of the war from 1950 to 1953 was the agreement that brokered peace to the region. The dynasty of Kim has been the sole administrator of the northern side of Korea, under the totalitarian arrangement. Explaining the system of government in South Korea, the country was administratively patterned after a military dictatorship that takes its position through a process of succession. This process continued unabated until direct elections was introduced, marking the milestone for the introduction of democracy. Diplomatic dialogues have been held by both nations after the war to further consolidate peace in the region since the 1970s (Moon & Steinberg, 1999).

To further broker peace between the two nations, the sunshine strategy was a venture taken by the government of Kim, in South Korea. This was obviously seen by the meeting that was held in North Korea in 2007 between the president of the North; Kim and South; President Roh Moo-hyun. The gathering brought about the signing of a mutual agreement between the two countries to maintain peace in the region. The next two administrations after the government of Roh Moo-hyun did not continue with the sunshine policy as it was greeted by wide criticisms of inefficiency and encouraging the domination of the Northern interest (Taylor, 2018).

The winter Olympics was another occasion that brought the two nations together in 2018. The northern participation of the games was a major diplomatic breakthrough, which made the expectation of the two nations more near and glaring. It was in this season that the Panmunjom declaration was done on April, 2018, signaling the seasons of prosperity, peace, and unification of the Korean peninsula (Buzo, 2012). Buzo (2012) went on to posit that agreement witnessed a hearty welcome and acceptance by the people of both nations. However, their existed still the tensions between the two nations.

Drawing from historical documentaries as posited by Buzo (2012), the geography that is today known quite from the ceasefire in the World War II, maintains a known site, occupied by Japan

since 1910, till the attack launched by the defund Soviet Union that led to the revocation or expunging of Japanese occupation in Korea. These very moves made the Soviet Union a major ally to the two nations before the involvement of the administration of the United States. The defund state of the soviet, getting concerned in the matters of the Peninsula made the United States to get afraid of the regional domination of Korea by the defunct state of the Soviet. Subsequent upon the involvement of the Soviet Union was the declaration by the USG, demanding that the Soviet Union leaves the southern part of the nation, including the metropolis of Seoul. The United States by virtue of this declaration came to dominate and dwell in the south, leaving the north to the Soviet Union. The USG sent their troops to the South Korea on the 8 of September, which marked the beginning of American presence in Korea (Buzo, 2012).

Theoretical Trappings

This study is anchored on 'Realist Theory' propounded by Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980). As a competing theory with expanded scope in Inter-States Conflict, political realism emphasizes both the competitive and conflictual aspects of politics. It is often opposed to idealism and liberalism, both of which promote collaboration. Realists Theory in strategy and international conflict highlight the political restrictions imposed by people' egoistic character, as well as the lack of international government, hence an international state of anarchism. These dynamics combine to produce a conflict-based international engagement paradigm in which states are the principal players, power and security are the top concerns, and morality is a secondary consideration. The realist tradition nuances encompass a set of ideas on state actors, egoism, anarchy, authority, morality and security.

The Realist Theory or Realism is a school of thought that further holds the view that inter-states politics is nothing but power politics (Kegley & Blanton,2011) The Theory posits that the nature of inter-states and international system reflects emphasis on power because power is the currency of international politics. The Theory identifies 'The State' as the most important actor on the world stage. It views the world of sovereign states as being anarchic, where there is no central or overarching government or an ultimate arbiter. Since the state are not answerable to any higher political authority and since there is no night watchman who can guarantee that one state would not attack another or rescue states if they are threatened by other countries, any state that wants to survive has no choice other to suspect the worst about the intentions of other states and to compete for power with them. This according to the Realist

is the tragedy of great power politics. Given this precarious situation, the reasonable and realistic thing for any state to do is to equip itself by acquiring enough power to protect itself, deter any belligerence and advance its interest so as to secure its survival.

The realist school of thought as expounded upon by Morgenthau(1904-1980) is one of the most significant schools of thought in strategy and international conflict studies. Its central ideas were derived from early modern Europe's Realpolitik statesmanship as a framework for study. Despite the fact that realism is a diverse body of ideas, it is united by this belief that international politics is always and necessarily a battlefield for power-seeking players. Since Hans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980) noble work, Realism has grown into three key factions based on their perspectives on the true causes of inter-state conflicts. Classical realists, Neo-realists, and Neo-classical realists are among them. Interstate disputes are attributed by Classical realists to human nature, whereas Neo-realists relate them to the dynamics of the anarchic state system. Interstate conflict, according to Neo-classical realists, arises from both internal politics and their inherent interaction and outcomes.

According to Morgenthau(1904-1980), Political Realism thinks that humanity is born selfish and competitive, not compassionate. Unless there are conditions under which humans can coexist, human nature is considered as egocentric (not necessarily selfish) and conflictual in this worldview, which is shared by theorists such as Thomas Hobbes. It also refutes the notion that a person's intuitive nature is chaotic. These people are self-sufficient and determined to achieve more power in terms of self-interest.

States gather and act on comprehensive and accurate facts using the rational model of decision-making. The state is sovereign, and it is guided by a power-based national interest. There is no international authority since anarchy is the basic restriction on the international system, and nations are left to their own means to maintain their own security. The major actors in the international system, according to realists, are sovereign states. Individuals, non-governmental organizations, multinational businesses, and other sub-state or trans-state entities are regarded to have only a limited amount of autonomy. Because territorial growth is limited only by opposing forces, governments are born aggressive (offensive realism) and security-conscious (defensive realism). However, if an opponent builds up its own arsenal in reaction, a security paradox emerges, in which reinforcing one's security may lead to even greater instability (an arms race). As a result, security becomes a zero-sum game in which only relative

benefits are possible (Donnelly, 2008). Arising from the foregoing, the theories of political realism as expounded by Morgenthau are founded on the following central assumptions:

1. International Politics is governed by objective laws which have roots in human nature.
2. National Interest in the international system is defined in terms of national power
3. Interest in the international system is always dynamic
4. Abstract moral principles cannot be applied to politics, especially in the international system.
5. In the international system, the difference between moral aspirations of a nation and the universal moral principles are manifested.
6. There should be emphasis on the autonomy of international politics.

Methodology

For the purpose of validity and in adherence to the dynamics of the research inherent pattern, we adopted a documentary method of data collection. This technique aims to depict, decode, translate, and understand the meaning rather than the frequency. The documentary technique is ideal for this study because it is well-suited for contextual analysis and advantageous when the goal is to harvest, enlighten, analyze, and extract pertinent information in order to make inferences from the current evidence. The advantage of the documentary technique, according to Obikeze (quoted in Nnabugwu, 2006, p.372), is that it is “able to obtain access to organizational structure, bureaucratic processes.... It can more easily lead to the finding of the unexpected phenomenon.” This strategy is necessary because the study relied extensively on qualitative data acquired from secondary sources. This method can also be used to chart the progress of a case.

As a result, this study relied on institutional and official papers, such as official documents from the US Departments of State and Defense that outline the US's North Korean strategy. Conference and workshop papers, journal articles, and other published publications were also employed as secondary sources of data in this study, providing a valuable tool for studying United States impositions of sanctions on North Korea and the denuclearization agenda. Qualitative analysis was equaled deployed, which delves deeper into the realm of interpretation by attempting to grasp not only the visible but also the hidden content of data in order to identify patterns or regularities in the data. Tables were also used to shed more light on and clarify issues that were being debated

Findings:

Imposition of Sanctions on North Korea by Donald Trump and Joe Biden Presidency and Commitment to Denuclearization Summit Agreement

The driving objective of this paper is to establish how the continuous imposition of coordinated sanctions by the Donald Trump and Joe Biden Presidency against North Korea has limited sustainable denuclearization agreement. The Trump and Biden's Presidency, while it brings to the negotiation table respectively the intentions and ideal of denuclearization for North Korea, the United States in the same vein imposes sanctions among other limitations to North Korea, which has made the denuclearization agreement counterproductive. How could a country that is bent on bringing normalcy in the international system as it affects the proliferation of nuclear weapons, in turn stab its own feet through imposition of coordinated sanctions against the country it is trying to negotiate and expect the country to remain adamant and subservient to their vehement caprices? This is one of the reasons why irrespective of the myriads of agreements on denuclearizing, North Korea have rather facilitated the nuclear proliferation or the intensification of North Korea's nuclear programme. This plethora of strategic sanctions range from those against individuals, companies & entities engage in business with North Korea, despite resolution to resume negotiation by both nations, the US has through such other punitive measures like the annulment of the US-NK summit agreements in 2018 by US & 29 other countries, to the US abduction of North Korea vessel in May 2019 after the summit in Hanoi. It is against this backdrop that the sustainability of agreements between the United States and North Korea, especially the one relating to denuclearization of North Korea has not been successful and effective over the years.

Imposition of Coordinated Sanctions by United States and Non-compliance of North Korea to Denuclearization Agreement

United States imposition of sanctions against North Korea have manifested in several ways. Some of such include the imposition of economic sanctions, political sanctions and all other forms of ban on informal engagement between the indigenes of both countries. More than 13 US laws have been broken or are being broken by North Korea. Three of these laws have a direct influence on the United States economic sanctions against North Korea, which began on June 28, 1950, when the US imposed a blanket ban on shipments to North Korea under the US Export Control Act of 1949. The Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951 prohibited most

avored country duties on North Korean exports to the United States, while the Export Administration Act of 1979 permitted North Korea to be labeled a terrorist state after its operatives blew up KAL 858 on November 19, 1987. North Korea's activities have crossed the lines of various US statutes that automatically imposed economic sanctions until the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Chang, 2007). In examining the nature of economic sanctions on North Korea by the United States we decongested it into the following:

1. Pre-1991 U.S. Economic Sanctions against North Korea
2. Post-1991 Economic Sanctions against North Korea.

The grand sanction on North Korea was laid on the strength of the Export Control Act of 1949, the United States imposed a blanket ban on shipments to North Korea on June 28, 1950, just three days after the Korean War began (Chang & Fall, 2006). This embargo marked the start of a lengthy series of economic penalties imposed by the United States against North Korea. On December 16, 1950, President Truman issued Presidential Proclamation 2914, which essentially imposed new economic restrictions upon North Korea under then-current regulations. The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 empowered the President to issue the proclamation. The US Treasury Department adopted Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR) a few days later, prohibiting any financial dealings with or on behalf of North Korea (Rennack, 2003).

In 1951, the United States approved the Trading Agreement Extension Act, which compelled all communist nations, except Yugoslavia, to lose their Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status. On September 1, 1951, North Korea was refused MFN trading status. The denial is still going on. The United States gives MFN or better status to nations that account for more than 99 percent of world exports, thus rejection of MFN would be manifestly exceptional. Indeed, the term 'Most-Favored-Nation,' or MFN, was formally replaced with the more fitting 'Normal-Trade- Relations,' or NTR, in 1998 (Preeg, 1999). Because of the NTR rejection, North Korean items are practically forbidden from entering the US market. The United States enacted its first International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) on August 26, 1955, prohibiting exports and imports of military items and defense services to or from specified countries: 'North Korea has been classified as a prohibited country from the ITAR's establishment' (Rennack, 2003, p. 11).

Another pre-1991 economic sanction against North Korea by the United States was on September 4, 1961, when the Foreign Assistance Act was passed, authorizing a wide range of

development assistance Programmes from the US government, including economic support funding, numerous multilateral Programmes, and housing and other credit guaranty Programmes. Others included the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, international organizations, debt- for-nature exchanges, international disaster assistance, and more. The Foreign Assistance Act, on the other hand, barred communist nations, including North Korea, from receiving most non- humanitarian aid. Following the foregoing, The United States enacted the Arms Export Control Act on October 22, 1968, putting North Korea on yet another route. The Act permitted military sales, loans, leases, and financing by the US government, as well as licensing of commercial weapons sales to foreign countries. However, the Act stipulated that sales to nations that the Secretary of State judged had regularly supplied assistance for acts of international terrorism would be prohibited. North Korea was featured in this category once again.

The United Nations welcomed both South and North Korea as members on September 18, 1991. The two Koreas signed the worthless South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on December 31, 1991. According to the Declaration, both countries pledged not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, own, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons,” as well as “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” Economic sanctions do not just apply to North Korea as a country; economic restrictions have also been imposed on North Korean corporations as well as foreign companies that have aided North Korea. The US penalized the reputed German chemical firm Degussa in 1990 for illegally providing North Korea with US-made reactor fuel. The United States sanctioned Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation of North Korea for missile proliferation operations on March 6, 1992 (Cheng, 2007).

On November 29, 1987, a bomb placed by two North Korean operatives exploded mid-flight on Korean Air Lines 858, which was travelling from Baghdad (Iraq) and was 45 minutes away from Bangkok (Thailand). 115 passengers and crew members were killed in the explosion. According to the Export Administration Act of 1979, North Korea was added to the list of nations that assist international terrorism on January 20, 1988. North Korea was unable to borrow development funding from international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund due to its inclusion on the list. The positioning is still going on. The United States learnt about fresh building at a nuclear site near the North

Korean town of Yongbyon in 1989 according to satellite pictures. North Korea, which had signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 but had not yet permitted inspections of its nuclear facilities, was thought by US intelligence experts to be in the early stages of developing an atomic weapon. This was the start of what looks to be an endless discussion tying North Korea's NPT compliance to normalization of ties with the US. The Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, and the Cold War came to an end. The Soviet Union's economic support for North Korea came to an end at this point. North Korea's policies may have shifted from befuddled animal crossing paths with US regulations to a determined dictatorship following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Post-1991 U.S. Economic Sanctions against North Korea gained significant momentum around 1994. After four months of talks, the US and North Korea agreed on the "Agreed Framework" on October 21, 1994, to resolve US concerns about Pyongyang's plutonium-producing reactors and the Yongbyon reprocessing plant. The Framework led to the formation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multinational organization tasked with assisting North Korea in the development of energy-related projects as part of international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. North Korea reverted to its old pattern of shooting down a US helicopter near the DMZ in December 1994, rather than condemning its purported encroachment across the negotiating table (Chang & Fall, 2006). The United States Treasury Department established Foreign Assets Control Regulations in 1995 as a follow-up to the Agreed Framework, allowing for travel-related activities, increased telecommunications, news bureaus, banking, and the importing of magnesite from North Korea. Following floods and hunger in North Korea in 1996, the Treasury Department adopted Foreign Assets Control Regulations, which allowed gifts to be made to meet fundamental human needs.

According to Chang and Spring (2006), the United States slapped sanctions against North Korea and Iran on May 24, 1996, for transfers of missile technology. Sanctions barred any imports or exports to sanctioned companies and sections of the North Korean economy thought to be involved in missile development. However, because both nations already had a comprehensive trade embargo, the penalties were merely symbolic and had little actual consequence. In response to Pyongyang's transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratory, the US slapped sanctions against North Korea and Pakistan on April 17, 1998. North Korea's development of long-range missiles capable of reaching the US mainland

was the major source of concern for the US. Former US Defense Secretary William Perry visited North Korea on May 25-28, 1999, and gave a US proposal. North Korea replied positively on September 13, 1999, by promising to halt long-range missile tests.

On June 19, 2000, modifications to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations were published, easing US economic restrictions against North Korea. The prohibition on exports to North Korea was lifted, U.S. passports were valid for travel to North Korea, and individuals no longer need U.S. government permission to visit the country; and U.S. travel agency operators were permitted to organize group trips to North Korea. The United States slapped penalties against North Korea's Changgwang Sinyong Corporation on January 2, 2001, and June 26, 2001, for violating the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which was approved on October 6, 2000. The United States slam sanctions against the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation and the North Korean government for providing missile technology to Yemen on August 16, 2002. Although the penalties are mostly symbolic, the actions that led to them were not favorable to the continuation of bilateral talks between the US and North Korea (Chang & Spring, 2006).

In retrospect, the years 1999 to 2000 reflect the first of two missed opportunities of resolving the North Korean-US conflict. President Clinton was progressive enough to agree to a test moratorium on long-range missiles in exchange for symbolic sanctions relief. In exchange for a verified cessation to North Korea's nuclear and long-range missile activities, President Clinton was not progressive enough to negotiate the next step, which was to lift the NTR denial and remove North Korea from the list of nations sponsoring international terrorism. The symbolic ease with which the United States levied sanctions may have been insufficient to persuade North Korean authorities to hand over their prized nuclear technology.

The World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked on September 11, 2001. In his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, President Bush described North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an axis of evil. This public portrayal of North Korea might have been all North Korean authorities needed to convince themselves that desescalating the conflict with the United States was futile. The conflict between the two countries began to deteriorate. The United States publicly announced the finding of North Korea's nuclear program on October 16, 2002. North Korea said in October that it was resuming its nuclear weapons development, in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. As a result, the United States, Japan, and South Korea

suspended oil deliveries to North Korea that had been pledged under the 1994 agreement. Rice exports from Japan have also been halted (Spring, 2006).

According to Chang and Spring (2006), the Bush administration suggested that the matter be taken up by the United Nations Security Council, as well as multilateral economic penalties, but to no success. The International Atomic Energy Agency found North Korea in violation of atomic safeguards on February 12, 2003, and brought the issue to the United Nations Security Council. The United States slammed sanctions against the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for a missile-related transfer on March 24, 2003. North Korea said on July 31, 2003 that it was willing to participate in six-party talks with the US, Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia to address the country's nuclear program. Representatives from the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea convened in Beijing on August 27-29, 2003, and again on February 25-28, 2004, to resolve differences over North Korea's nuclear weapons development, but no major progress was made.

The period from 2001 to 2003 is the second time when opportunities were squandered. The hostile environment created by President Bush's "axis of evil" speech, as well as the United States' failure to make a substantive offer early in the talks on issues like NTR status and branding as a terror-supporting country may have convinced North Korean leaders that the talks were doomed to fail. On October 18, 2004, President George W. Bush signed the largely symbolic North Korean Human Rights Act (Chang & Spring, 2006), which required human rights issues to be addressed in any negotiations with North Korea, tied humanitarian aid to North Korean human rights improvements, and authorized the United States to allow North Koreans to apply for refugee and asylum status in the United States even if South Korea accepts them for settlement with South Korean citizens.

What could be described as the recent trends of economic sanctions on North Korea began in 2006. It is important to note, however, that in September 2005, the US identified the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia as Pyongyang's primary money laundering channel, forcing China to close North Korea's transaction account at the bank, while a presidential decree froze the US assets of 11 North Korean trading firms, tightening its grip on the financial network used to fund North Korean illicit financial activities. All American banks have been barred from interacting with Banco Delta Asia, according to the US Treasury Department. All transactions with Banco Delta Asia were halted by Bank of Tokyo, Mitsubishi, and Mizuho Corporate Bank

of Japan (Mainichi Shimbun, February 2, 2006). As of February 1, 2006, Korea Exchange Bank, which was the only South Korean bank dealing with Banco Delta Asia, ceased doing business with the company.

The year 2006 began with reports from the United States about North Korea's purported currency counterfeiting and money laundering operations. On January 23, 2006, a delegation from the United States Treasury Department provided South Korean officials with what they deemed to be compelling proof that North Korea was counterfeiting and laundering US currency. Raphael Pen, a congressional researcher in charge of tracking Pyongyang's drug dealings and counterfeiting, stated on January 27, 2006 that the US had completed a rough draft of an executive order that would prohibit any financial firms involved in transactions with North Korea from conducting business in the US.

On February 16, 2006, the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, which the US had identified as North Korea's principal money-laundering conduit, halted all transactions with the country and begged that the US not impose additional restrictions prohibiting the US or other countries from doing business with it. On March 18, 2006, the People's Bank of China issued a directive to China's financial institutions, encouraging them to be more watchful against phony \$100 notes smuggled into the country from North Korea. On May 28, 2006, the US banned all citizens, permanent residents, and US-based businesses from using North Korean vessels. The current sanctions have begun to have an impact on the North Korean economy, as seen by the trade numbers presented later in this article.

There were irregular claims in May 2006 that the US and South Korean security services had discovered North Korean preparations for a long-range missile test launch. North Korea test-fired seven missiles on July 5, 2006 (North Korean date), one of which was the long-range Taepodong-2 type, which landed into the Sea of Japan 40 seconds after launch. At 3:32 a.m. local time, the first missile was launched. Between 2:30 and 3:10 a.m., Asiana flight OZ 235 from Chicago to Incheon International Airport traveled over the airspace. Later, the Korean Ministry of Construction and Transportation instructed aircraft flying over the Russian peninsula and across North Korean airspace to instead fly over the Pacific Ocean (Chang 2007). On July 5, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1540, condemning North Korea's missile launches and demanding U.N. member nations not to sell or acquire anything associated

to North Korea's missile and weapons of mass destruction Programmes, by a vote of 15 to 0. The resolution omitted any reference to Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which would have made the resolution enforceable by armed force.

It is also worth noting that the main focus of the July 4, 2006 missile test was not the missile itself, but rather the long-range missile. North Korea tested short-range missiles on March 24, 2003, and again on May 1, 2005, without provoking a major response from the US. The *Mainichi Shimbun* newspaper in Japan stated on September 14, 2006, that the Japanese government has decided to block 8 withdrawals and overseas transfers from accounts held by organizations and persons suspected of having ties to North Korea, as well as freeze North Korean assets. This step essentially freezes Pyongyang's assets in Japan, effectively prohibiting any additional offshore

financial transactions routed to North Korean entities based in Japan.

North Korea stated its intention to conduct a nuclear test on October 3, 2006, citing "US pressures and sanctions." On October 9, 2006, around 10:35 a.m., a state-run geological institution in South Korea recorded a 3.58-3.7 magnitude tremor in North Korea's North Hamgyeong Province. On the same day, North Korea's officials of the Korean Central News Agency released a statement claiming, "On October 9, 2006, the field of scientific research in [North Korea] successfully performed an underground nuclear test under secure conditions". South Korea claimed that the test breached the Joint Declaration for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was signed in 1991. Even if the United Nations Security Council passes a resolution punishing North Korea, the Korean government has chosen to continue with two inter-Korean commercial initiatives, namely the construction of the Kaesong joint industrial complex and package excursions to Mt. Kumgang. On October 11, Japan imposed further sanctions against North Korea, including a prohibition on North Korean ships accessing Japanese ports, a restriction on most, if not all, North Korean citizens visiting Japan, and, most critically, a ban on all North Korean imports.

From the above, it is obvious that North Korea is in breach of a slew of US regulations, prompting the imposition of economic penalties that has in turn lead to further deterioration of the denuclearization agreement. North Korea appears to be most harmed by three sanctions. The first is the denial of North Korea's NTR status, which was imposed on its exports to the US on September 1, 1951, after the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. In the aftermath of

North Korea's bombing of Korean Air Lines 858 on November 29, 1987, which killed 115 people, North Korea was added to a list of countries that aid international terrorism. The third is a series of financial sanctions imposed by the United States that began in 2005 and ended on February 16, 2006, when the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, which the US had identified as North Korea's main money-laundering conduit, announced that all transactions with the country had been suspended. The effectiveness of the US Security Council sanctions issued in October 2006 remains to be seen.

The middle road, which no one wants, points to a continuation of the current state of chaos, in which North Korea threatens its neighbors, prompts more contentious international sanctions, and tries to extort more money from South Korea, which may be the only country willing to provide funds for little or no return. The path to the right, which North Korea's neighbors despise, may need new US legislation modeled after the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Chang, 2005). Economic sanctions on North Korea have been few and inadequate (Whitty, et al., 2006), making new US-led or US-alone penalties an easier target. Finally, the path to the left, which demands a bold choice from all leaders, points to a major lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for a verifiable and unbreakable guarantee from North Korea not to seek nuclear weapons. When one considers the tumultuous engagement between North Korea and its democratic friends from September 1948, when the communist regime was established in the northern half of Korea, to the current day, it is difficult to be optimistic.

Another interesting phase of sanctions against North Korea by the United States came during Trump's Presidency. President Donald Trump, in 2017, needlessly threatened conflict with North Korea, but he then appeared to make good use of the panic by initiating talks with Kim Jong-un over the next two years (Brookings, 2020). As Nephew (2019) posited, the Trump administration has been admirably open about its objectives in placing sanctions on North Korea: to persuade the North Koreans to give up their existing nuclear and missile programmes, including nuclear weapons and the potential to develop more. With the occasional substitution of the word "dismantlement" for "denuclearization," the Trump administration resurrected the previous US policy of seeking the comprehensive, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of these programmes, offering a touch of ambiguity with respect to the missile program. This strategy is also consistent with UN Security Council

Resolution 1718, which “determined” in 2006 that North Korea “must renounce all nuclear weapons and current nuclear Programmes in a full, verifiable, and irreversible way,” as well as a comparable decision on other WMD and missile Programmes. Despite several opportunities to push down this goal in the interest of discussions, the Trump administration has mostly maintained its depiction of its immutability (Nephew, 2019). The table below shows the list of sanctions imposed by North Korea during the administration of Trump.

Table 1: Estimated Number of Sanctions against North Korea by US under Trump’s Administration

S/N	DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS	YEAR	SOURCE
1.	Opening bank branches and bank accounts in North Korea for the US citizens and companies.	2016	Sanction scanner
2.	Importing all of the luxurious goods to the United States	2017	Sanction scanner
3.	Freezing the assets of people participating in the country’s nuclear program.	2017	Sanction scanner
4.	Prohibition of trade machinery from military equipment to industrial machinery and vehicles in the United States	2017	Sanction scanner
5.	Banning North Korea from exporting minerals, electrical equipment, food, textiles, and wood.	2017	Sanction scanner
6.	Cooperating in terms of scientific and technical activities between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United Nations (UN)	2017	Sanction scanner
7.	Freeze assets of any company, business, organization, and individual that trades goods, services, or technology with North Korea	2017	Sanction scanner
8.	Seize any property belonging to the Korean Workers’ party or the North Korean government if it appears to be under their jurisdiction, hereby restricting investment by North Korean citizens.	2017	Sanction scanner
9.	Ban the export of electrical equipment, coal, minerals, seafood and other food and agricultural products, wood, textiles, and stones	2017	Council on Foreign Relations
10.	Ban on North Korean labor exports	2017	Council on Foreign Relations
11.	Ban the import of certain luxury goods	2018	Council on Foreign Relations
12.	Ban on imports of oil and refined petroleum products	2018	Council on Foreign Relations

13.	Ban on natural gas imports	2018	Council on Foreign Relations
14.	Restrict fishing rights in the Korean waters bordering the South and North of Korea	2018	Council on Foreign Relations
15.	Restriction of scientific and technical cooperation with North Korea	2018	Council on Foreign Relations
16.	Any transactions or dealings with the Government of North Korea or the Workers' Party of Korea	2018	Department of the treasury
17.	Vessels that have called at a port in North Korea in the previous 180 days, and vessels that have engaged in an STS transfer with such a vessel in the previous 180 days, from calling at a port in the United States	2018	Department of the treasury
18.	Registering a vessel in North Korea, obtaining authorization for a vessel to fly the North Korea flag, and owning, leasing, operating, and insuring any vessel flagged by North Korea.	2018	Department of the treasury

Source: Compiled and documented by the researcher (2023)

The table above reveals that sustained pattern of policy processes by way of imposition of sanctions by the United States on North Korea is to the effect of pressurizing them to come to the negotiation table with respect to the denuclearization of North Korea. Sustained observation shows that these sanctions, as economic as they are, were done during Trump's administration, which lends credence to the analysis that the administration of Trump more than the past regimes in the United States imposed one of the economic sanctions that made things economically difficult for North Korea. However, these sanctions to the extent of its strictness and strength did not bend North Korea to dance to the tune of the United States as productions in nuclear weapons rather increased during this administration. Also, the imposition of sanctions, especially economic sanctions has not been an effective way to getting a country to play along with the dictates of other country as what one country could do or trade with one country, it could also do or trade with another country. Hence, the case of North Korea and the United States explain that the goods banned from being exported and imported to the United States could be exported and sold in other emerging markets in Europe and Asia. This is why the imposition of sanctions on North Korea has never moved them to agree to the denuclearization biddings of the United States.

Be that as it may, the table above also shows that US sanctions on North Korea have a far-reaching scope, touching as it were on virtually all sectors of the economy. The main issue with

the US approach toward North Korea is that it ignores North Korean conceptions of national security interests. For many years, the North Koreans have made it plain that their country's national security is intrinsically tied to their ability to threaten disproportionate action against prospective opponents. On one hand, North Korea's potential to strike Seoul with tens of thousands of conventional artillery pieces might result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of South Koreans. North Korea, on the other hand, now has nuclear weapons and missiles capable of attacking a number of sites in Japan, the Pacific Ocean, and maybe the United States' West Coast. North Korea is also developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that can strike the majority of the United States.

On September 11, 2017, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2375, prohibiting North Korea from importing any refined petroleum products beyond certain limits (500,000 barrels between October and December 2017 and 2 million barrels per year thereafter). This basically put a ceiling on the amount of goods North Korea could import for the rest of 2017 and into the future. Three months later, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 23977, lowering the petroleum product quota to 500,000 barrels per year. Other clauses in both resolutions gradually increased restrictions on North Korea (such as those relating to its seafood exports), but the underlying idea remained the same: the US was willing to tighten sanctions as the international political climate permitted. During this time, the US added its own complementary authorities, with new executive orders combining with provisions of 2017's Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act to create a multifaceted sanctions regime that effectively allows sanctions to be targeted on North Korea's primary economic sectors as well as those who seek to evade or facilitate the evasion of US sanctions. However, as a result of these efforts, the cupboard of fresh penalties ideas is becoming more barren (Nephew, 2019). Simply said, no more US legislation is necessary to apply maximum pressure on North Korea; the focus now must be on action, notably the application of sanctions against North Korea's enablers and economic partners across the world. To boost pressure, fresh UNSC sanctions are not necessary; rather, UN member states must reaffirm their commitment to them. Similarly, rather than law, the US now lacks intelligence gathering, sanctions case preparation, and execution.

The United States and the United Nations Security Council have put monitoring at the center of their sanctions policy. The UN Panel of experts mandated by the UNSC with observing and reporting on sanctions implementation, continues to report extensive evasion of UN sanctions

on North Korea, including across all main areas of the pressure campaign, including in finance, energy, and armaments (United Nations Security Council, 2019). Similarly, the US has slammed many rounds of sanctions on a number of front businesses and other organizations involved in sanctions evasion and smuggling. The majority of these organizations are situated in China and Russia, which is particularly harmful in terms of delivering a strong message of UNSC unity to North Korea and other members of the world community because they are permanent members of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council, 2019).

The Trump administration has been quite open about the parameters under which it will withdraw all sanctions against North Korea, just as it has been in identifying its objectives. The more challenging part has been elucidating the potential of modest sanctions relief in exchange for North Korean nuclear or missile concessions. According to multiple press reports, the US has either made or would be willing to make such an offer, which US envoy to North Korea Steve Biegun seemed to confirm in a speech at Stanford in January 2019. North Korean has communicated that they are prepared to pursue simultaneously and in parallel all of the commitments the two leaders made in their joint statement at Singapore last summer (Smith, 2019).

The Trump Presidency was expected to use the decreasing opportunity for a genuine diplomatic process to make a serious, substantial, incremental proposal to the North Koreans that, if implemented, would boost both parties' confidence in the process and allow for a genuine de-escalation of tensions. The US should also take advantage of the time it will take to absorb this plan to begin laying the groundwork with allies for not just an increase of sanctions pressure but also a recommitment by the US, its UNSC colleagues, and other members of the world community to it. This may need moving other items lower on the priority list or attempting to address them as quickly as possible in order to free up diplomatic channels for the North Korean issue. Above all, the US should cease acting and preparing as if North Korean submission or collapse is a certain conclusion, and instead consider the country and its leadership as an unpleasant but likely long-term reality of international affairs that requires thoughtful, serious interaction.

North Korea has also received some level of sanction from other countries that happens to be allies to the United States, resulting from the continuity of their nuclear program irrespective

of internal warnings and agreements. The table below enlists some countries that have imposed sanctions on North Korea.

Table 2: United States allies that imposed sanctions on North Korea

S/N	COUNTRY	YEAR	NATURE OF SANCTION
1.	Japan	2006, 2016, 2017	The restriction of commercial and diplomatic exchanges between north Korea and Japan. These measures freeze certain North Korean assets, banning of bilateral trade with North Korea, restrict the entry of North Korean citizens and ships into Japanese territory, and prohibit remittances worth more than \$880.
2.	European Union	2006, 2017, 2018	Economic restrictions between the countries of the European Union and North Korea. These include the ban on the admission and residency of people who have facilitated the DPRK's weapons program, deny North Koreans access to specialized training, prohibit the export of oil and luxury products, ban on EU investment across North Korean economic sectors, and capital remittances to North Korea
3.	South Korea	Since the end of the Korean war	The imposition of Economic, military, corporate sanctions on North Korea.

Source: Council on Foreign Relations (2019)

The table above reveals that the imposition of sanctions on North Korea was not just done by the United States alone, but also by its allies and international organizations where it has higher stakes and influence than others. Some of the sanctions on North Korea by the allies of the United States have lasted for over a decade; still North Korea has not been pressurized to come to the negotiation table to totally end its nuclear production. It is pertinent to posit that the imposition of sanctions on North Korea by those allies of the United States depict that beyond North Korea being a major rival of the United States, the presence of north and what it represents threatens the corporate sovereignty of the states that has imposed sanctions on them.

The United Nations have also imposed sanctions on North Korea resulting from its non-compliance to the denuclearization programme and agreement. Since 2006, the United Nations Security Council has passed nine significant sanctions resolutions on North Korea in response

to its nuclear and missile Programmes. Each resolution criticizes North Korea’s most recent nuclear and ballistic missile tests and calls on the country to stop acting illegally, in violation of prior UN

Security Council resolutions. The security Council unanimously approved all nine resolutions, with the exception of Resolution 2087 (January 2013), which mentions acting under Chapter VII, Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. The table below shows the nature of sanctions imposed by North Korea by the United Nations.

Table 3: United Nations Sanctions on North Korea

S/N	Nature of sanction	Year
1.	The United Nations restricted the Owning, leasing, operating, chartering, or providing vessel classification, certification or associated service and insurance or re-insurance, to any North Korean owned, controlled, or operated vessel	2018
2.	The United Nations restricted the Provision of insurance or re-insurance services to vessels belonging to North Korea. Member states were mandated to involved in the activities or the transport of items prohibited by the relevant resolutions	2018
3.	The United Nations restricted the Provision of bunkering services or the transportation of oil to North Korean vessels.	2018
4.	The restriction of ship-to-ship transfers to or from North Korean-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are supplied, sold, or transferred to or from North Korea.	2018
5	Denial of Port entry of vessels from North Korea to United Nations countries	2018

Source: Department of Treasury (2018)

The table above shows that the United Nations also joined forces with the United States and its allies to impose sanctions on North Korea and everything that pertains to it. The decision of the United Nations to impose sanctions on North Korea was influenced by the United State to further frustrate the economy of North Korea, thus, bringing them to dance to the tone of the United States.

According to Philipp (2018), North Korea is also urged to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it joined in 1985 but withdrew in 2003 after the US accused it of pursuing an illegal uranium enrichment program. North Korea has also been asked by the UN Security Council to restart negotiations in the Six-Party Talks, which include South Korea, North Korea,

China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. The Six-Party Talks took place from 2003 to 2009 and resulted in a joint statement on denuclearization. North Korea also dismantled its plutonium-producing reactor as part of the process, albeit it was eventually restored. The 1718 Committee,

created by Security Council Resolution 1718 in 2006, and a Panel of Experts, established by Security Council Resolution 1874 in 2009 oversee the implementation of North Korean sanctions. The panel reports to the Security Council on the status of sanctions and enforcement on a regular basis (Philipp, 2018).

In reaction to North Korea's ICBM test on November 29, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2397 on December 22, 2017. The Principal Provisions of Resolution 2397 include; that North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile Programmes are financed in part by cash produced by exports and employees in other countries (Philipp, 2018). The United States also banned the importation of some products and goods from North Korea during the Trump's administration. The Department of States Treasury (2018) catalogues the goods banned to include: Coal, Textiles, Seafood, Iron and iron ore, Lead and lead ore, Copper, Nickel, Zinc, Gold, Silver, Titanium ore, Rare earth metals, Vanadium ore, Statues and monuments, Conventional arms, Food and agricultural products, Machinery, Electrical equipment, Earth and stone, including magnesia and magnetite, Wood, Vessels, Fishing rights, etc. The effect of this ban was the reduction in national earnings for North Korea as companies could not export produced goods, some the products that was not exported to the United States was pushed to other cheaper markets, where little amount of gain was made. Some companies experienced redundancy, leading to high level of unemployment and job loss among others (Katzeff, 2019).

Arguing further, North Korea also in the same vein limited the importation of certain products from the United States. The table below will seek to justify the foregoing, by providing the list of goods that was barred from imported into North Korea from the United States. North Korea is unable to sell its most important exports due to the sanctions. Chinese imports from North Korea fell by 88 percent in 2018. Chinese imports of North Korean coal, iron ore, and other natural resources surged considerably from 2010 onwards, according to UN data. However, between January and March 2018, China did not import any coal from North Korea. Chinese trade statistics may not be completely trustworthy, especially when it comes to politically sensitive matters like North Korean sanctioned commodities imports. Smuggling, for example,

is clearly not included. Nonetheless, it's implausible that Beijing would have acquired any major quantities of coal from North Korea and then just ignored them (Katzeff, 2019).

Table 4: Goods banned from exported to North Korea by the United States

S/N	Nature of goods
1.	Refined petroleum (beyond 500,000 barrels/year)
2.	Crude oil (beyond 4,000,000 barrels/year)
3.	Aviation fuel (except fuel required for an aircraft to return to North Korea).
4.	Rocket fuel
5	Condensates and natural gas liquids
6	Industrial machinery
7	All transportation vehicles (including motor vehicles, trucks, trains, ships, aircraft, helicopters)
8	Iron, steel, and other Metals
9	Conventional arm
10	Ballistic missiles
11	Weapons of mass destruction & components
12	Luxury goods

Source: Department of States Treasury (2018).

The table above shows that the United States during the administration of Trump did not just impose sanctions on economic activities of North Korea with the united state, but also narrowed down the sanctions to some selected goods as represented in the table above. It could be said that the imposition of sanction on some goods from North Korea is quite strategic and pivotal as the goods are of high value and could to a large extent affect the economy of its owner if not properly traded and on time. In the midst of the above date, North Korea has rather thrived in its nuclear programmes, having no record of economic meltdown affecting it armaments programme.

The imposition of sanction by the United States also came in the dimension of sanctions on individuals who are officially or corporately connected to the United States government. These individuals are officials, business men and administrators in United States. They were barred

from operating and working in the United States as a means of sending signals to the government of Korea on the need to give heed or follow the provisions of the denuclearization agreement. The table below provides statistical details of the individual persons sanctioned by the United States government.

Table 5: List of North Korean individuals on sanction by the United States

S/N	Name	Role of individual	Type	Position of the Individual
1.	CHA, Sung-jun	Businessman	Individual	A North Korean bank representative based in Beijing, China
2.	CHANG, Chang-ha	Official	Individual	The president of SANS, a North Korea-run organization responsible Risk advisory for R&D into advanced weapon systems
3.	CHO, Chun-ryong	Official	Individual	The chairman of SEC, a North Korean state-run entity involved in ballistic missiles production
4.	CHO, Il-U	Official	Individual	The director of ROB, a North Korea intelligence organization
5.	CHO, Yon-chun	Official	Individual	A senior North Korean bureaucrat
6.	CHOE, Chang-pong	Official	Individual	A senior North Korean bureaucrat
7.	CHOE, Chun-Sik	Official	Individual	The head of North Korea's long-range missile programme
8.	CHOE, Chun-yong	Businessman	Individual	A Russia-based representative of Ilsim International Bank, a North Korean bank
9.	CHOE, Hwi	Official	Individual	A senior North Korean bureaucrat
10.	CHOE, Pu-Il	Official	Individual	A senior North Korean bureaucrat in the Ministry of People's Security
11.	CHOE, Sok-min	Official	Individual	An overseas representative of FTB, a North Korean state-owned bank
12.	CHOE, Song-Il	Official	Individual	A Vietnam-based representative of TCB, a North Korean state-owned bank
13.	CHOE, Song-nam	Official	Individual	A China-based representative of Korea Daesong Bank, a North Korean state-owned bank
14.	CHU, Hyok	Official	Individual	A Russia-based representative of FTB, a North Korean state-owned bank

Source: Risk advisory (2021).

The table above also points out that several individuals, who happen to be either businessmen or officials who have trans-border linkages with companies, institutes, and organizations in the United States were also variously sanctioned. This was done to further persuade North Korea to agree to the denuclearization agreements that has taken over 20 decades. These individuals, businessmen and officials are very much important to the American society that the isolation and closing of their linkages with the United State would not just affect the individuals involved, but also the American society, which has for years been a major recipient of its services. However, the imposition of sanctions on individuals from North Korea has not yielded the desired outcomes as some of these companies relocated to other emerging economies, where they are recording groundbreaking successes and developments.

Alongside the sanctions imposed on individual are the sanctions imposed on companies and business firms from operating in the United States. The table below will elucidate more on the number and details of the North Korean companies sanctioned by the United States

Table 6: List of business entities sanctioned by the United States

S/N	Name	Role of entity/ business	Type	Description of the Business Entity
1.	7-28	Vessel	Entity	A North Korean vessel
2.	Academy of National Defense science	Government establishment	Entity	Research and development arm of North Korea's advanced weapons systems programme
3.	Agricultural Development Bank	Bank	Entity	A North Korean state-owned bank
4.	Am Nok Gang	Bank	Entity	A North Korean Entity
5.	Amroggang Development Banking Corporation	Company	Entity	A North Korean Bank
6.	AN SAN 1	Vessel	Entity	A North Korean Vessel
7.	Andariel	Company	Entity	A North Korean state-sponsored malicious cyber group, with links to RGB, a North Korean intelligence organization
8.	BAEK MA KANG	Vessel	Entity	A vessel owned by a North Korean entity sanctioned for illicit arms transfers

9.	Bank of East Land	Bank	Entity	A North Korean state-owned financial institution
10.	Bluenoroff	Company	Entity	a North Korean state-sponsored malicious cyber group, with links to RGB, a North Korean intelligence organization
11.	Central Bank of Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Bank	Entity	North Korea's Central Bank
12.	Central Military Commis	Government	Entity	A North Korean government organization that oversees the North Korean military and military-linked companies
13.	Cheil Credit Bank	Bank	Entity	A North Korean financial services company
14.	CHON MA SAN	Vessel	Entity	A North Korean tanker owned by a sanctioned entity
15.	CHON MYONG 1	Vessel	Entity	A North Korean oil tanker
16.	CHONG BONG	Vessel	Entity	A North Korean vessel
17.	CHONG CHON GANG	Vessel	Entity	A North Korean vessel
18.	Chong Chon Gang Shipping Co. Ltd.	Company	Entity	A North Korean shipping company involved in illicit arms transfers
19.	CHONG RIM 2	Vessel	Entity	A vessel owned by sanctioned North Korean entities involved in illicit arms transfers
20.	Chongbong Shipping Co Ltd	Company	Entity	A North Korean vessel involved in illicit arms transfers Chonmyong Shipping Co
21.	Chonmyong Shippign Co	Company	Entity	A North Korean shipping company
22.	CK International Ltd	Company	Entity	A North Korean logistics company
23.	Daedong Credit Bank (DCB)	Bank	Entity	A North Korean state-owned bank
24.	Daewon Industries	Company	Entity	A North Korean energy company
25.	DAT HONG DAN	Vessel	Entity	A North Korean vessel involved in illicit arms transfers
26.	Dawn Marine Management Co Ltd	Company	Entity	A North Korean shipping company
27.	DOK CHON	Vessel	Entity	A North Korean vessel involved in illicit arms transfers
28.	First Oil JV Co Ltd	Company	Entity	The co-owner of a North Korean oil tanker

29.	Foreign Trade Bank (FTB)	Bank	Entity	North Korea’s foreign exchange bank
30.	General Bureau of Atomic Energy (GBAE)	Government	Entity	A North Korean government agency

Source: Risk advisory (2021).

The table above shows that business entities owned by North Korea also received a fair share of the sanctions from the United States. These sanctions are meant to limit their operations and activities in the United States to further make things harder for North Korea in order to pressurize North Korea to come to the negotiation table.

Sanctions Against North Korea by Joe Biden’s Presidency

Joe Biden was inaugurated as US president POTUS on 20th January, 2021 and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un launched its new wave of nuclear missiles testing barely two months in office of Biden’s presidency, North Korea fires two short range cruise missiles on 21 March, 2021 but the United States under Biden did not respond immediately as it plays down on such first testing (Reuters.2021). However, Biden imposes its first round of sanctions on North Korea on 12 January, 2022. The conflict between United States and North Korea continue to gain traction under Biden as North Korea continue to undermine the agreement on denuclearization.

Table 7: Imposition of Sanction by Joe Biden Administration Against North Korea Designated Individuals, Nationality, Secondary Sanction Risk, Applicable US Law

1.	CHOE, Song hol (Korean) aka CHOE, Cholung, G.male Lives, Korea, North.	North Korea (DPRK 4)	Transactions prohibited for persons owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions	North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.204
2.	CHOE, UN HYOK (Korean) G.Male Lives, Moscow, Russia	North Korea (DPRK 3)	Transactions prohibited for persons owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions	North Korea Sanctions Regulations Section 510.214, 510.20, & 510.210
3.	IM, Song sun (Korean) G. Male Lives, Korea, North	North Korea (DPRK 4)	Transactions prohibited for persons owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions	North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.204 and 510.210.
4.	JANG, Myong Chol (aka. CHANG, Myong-chol), gender male lives in	North Korea (DPRK 4)	Transactions prohibited for persons owned or	North Korea Sanctions Regulations section

	Shenyang, China, Dandong China.		controlled by U.S. financial institutions	510.204, and 510.210.
5.	KANG, Kyong Il (aka, KANG, KYong-il) lives in Tehran, Iran	North Korea (DPRK)	Transactions prohibited for persons owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions	North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.204 and 510.210
6.	KANG, Phyong Guk (aka KANG, Pyong Guk) lives in Beijing, China Gender, Male.	North Korea (DPRK)	Transactions prohibited for persons owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions	North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.204, and 510.210
7	R1, Sung Il (aka, R1, Su'ng-il), lives in Tehran, Iran, Gender- Male	North Korea (DPRK)	Transactions prohibited for persons owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions	North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.204, and 51
8.	SO, Myong (Korean) Lives in Vladivostok, Russia. Gender, Male	North Korea (DPRK) (NDWMD)	Transactions prohibited for persons owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions	North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.214
The OFAC under Joe Biden added the following Entity for sanctions designation list:				
		Nationality	Sanctions	Applicable US Law
	KIMSUKY (aka. 'APT 43; aka 'ARCHIPELAGO' aka 'BLACK BANSHEE", aka 'EMERALD SLEET; aka 'NICKEL KIMBALL', aka THALLUM', aka. 'VELVET CHOLLIMA'),	North Korea website onearth. Xyz; alt. etc	Transactions prohibited for persons owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions	North Korea Sanctions Regulations section 510.210, 510.201, 510.214.

Source: ofac.beasury.gov./11/30/2023release.

(office of foreign assets control) (2023)

The Treasury Targets DPRK's International Agents and Illicit Cyber Instruction Group.

The US has been imposing sanctions on the regime since 2008, and the new measures might be added to those announced in November, which targeted North Korean maritime activities as well as Chinese firms doing business with Pyongyang. Irrespective of all these, sanctions have had little or no much effect in deterring North Korea from developing missiles and nuclear weapons.

Resulting from the above sanctions, the United States and North Korea over the year have had series of talks aimed at the denuclearization of North Korea. The countries sometimes meet a deadlock and other times reaches agreement as it affects North Korea's nuclear programme. The table below will seek to provide the chronology of nuclear agreements by the economies of North Korea and the United States.

Annulment of the US-NK Summit Agreements by US and Delayed Denuclearization Agreement Implementation by North Korea

According to Jonsson (2018), the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, security assurances for the North Korean regime, and restoration of ties were all discussed at the meeting. The meeting, according to the Korea Institute for National Unification, lay the groundwork for ending the long-standing antagonism between the US and North Korea. Chairman Kim Jong-un and President Donald Trump both expressed a desire to strengthen bilateral ties, as well as warm emotions and respect for one another. They agreed to work together to strengthen relationships and build trust. Because of lack of trust and animosity, negotiations between the US and North Korea have always failed.

A commitment to build new US-DPRK ties was stated in the joint statement's first paragraph. Improving ties was thus a more important priority at the summit than establishing a long-term and stable peace regime or completing disarmament. Nonetheless, paragraphs 2 and 3 emphasize the goals of "creating an enduring and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula" and "full disarmament." The Panmunjom Declaration is reaffirmed in paragraph 3. In paragraph 4, the parties committed to return the remains of prisoners of war and those who went missing in battle (Jonsson, 2018). President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un promised to fully and speedily implement the provisions in the joint agreement. To put the declaration into effect, follow-up conversations were to be undertaken as soon as practicable.

Irrespective of the talks between the two countries, North Korea still maintained and increased its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon that produced fissile materials. This very act shows that North Korea does not plan to take tangible measures toward denuclearization as promised. North Korea demands that the US join in a proclamation formally declaring the end of the Korean War, which will be followed by a peace treaty. The US, on the other hand, refuses to do so unless North Korea demonstrates tangible indicators of denuclearization. Finally, given the United States has never declared its own arsenal to be nuclear-free, expecting North Korea to do

likewise is unrealistic (Von Hall, 2018). The inter-Korean summits as well as the North Korea-US meeting are significant measures toward resolving the conflict and achieving security on the Korean Peninsula. However, both accepted statements have inadequate enforcement measures, which might detract from their importance. Following that, despite a few significant actions taken to reduce inter-Korean tensions, there are no indicators that a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue is any closer (Von Hall, 2018).

The failure of Pompeo’s denuclearization discussions in Pyongyang underscores the Singapore summit’s weakness. Kim Jong-un pledged to “work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ in a joint declaration signed by both leaders. Kim was probably delighted to do so, given the phrase represents a long-held DPRK viewpoint that has little to do with denuclearization. The summit document’s core thrust is the notion of establishing a new bilateral tie between the US and the DPRK based on trust and confidence, including through the formation of a peace regime. That latter point is particularly crucial, because Pyongyang virtually probably believes that a peace regime or peace treaty will eliminate the need for US troops in the South. Equally important, the potential of denuclearization for the DPRK occurs as a result of the formation of a new ties with the US, rather than the other way around.

Table 8: Chronology of Denuclearization Agreements and talks between the United States and North Korea

S/N	Nature of Agreement	Year
1.	North Korea joins the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but fails to sign a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite being granted 18 months to do so.	December 12, 1985
2.	The United States was mandated by the agreement to withdraw all naval and land-based tactical nuclear weapons stationed abroad. These include the withdrawal of about 100 US nuclear weapons that was stationed in South Korea.	September 27, 1991
3.	North Korea pledged not to develop, manufacture, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. The agreements also forbid North Korea from owning nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities independently.	November 8, 1991
4.	The agreement mandated the both nations not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, own, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons, as well as not to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities,	January 20, 1992

5.	This agreement provided a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA	January 30, 1992
6.	North Korea's Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation was banned from missile proliferation activities	March 6, 1992
7.	This agreement was done in the time of Jimmy Carter. North Korea decided to reduce its production in nuclear weapon production.	June 15, 1994
8.	The agreement created a three-stage plan for dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In exchange, the US vows to reestablish economic and diplomatic relations with North Korea and promises to assist with the development of proliferation-resistant LWRs to replace the country's graphite-moderated reactors.	August 12, 1994
9.	The deal calls for North Korea to put its nuclear facilities on hold and eventually remove them, a process that will need the destruction of three nuclear reactors, two of which are currently under construction.	October 21, 1994
10.	This agreement mandated the United States to lift its economic sanctions on North Korea.	January 1996
11.	This agreement mandated North Korea to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary international agreement aimed at regulating the export of ballistic missile systems, components, and technology.	April 2 1-22, 1996
12.	North Korea in this agreement commits to refrain from testing any long-range missiles.	September 7-12, 1999
13.	This agreement signaled the commitment of the United States and North Korea to the Agreed Framework's implementation of nuclear disarmament.	October 12, 2000

Source: Davenport (2020).

The table above reveals that denuclearization agreements between the United States and North Korea did not begin today. The diplomatic talks between the two have taken more than a decade and yet nothing substantial has been secured there from. Some of the agreements between North Korea and the United States over the year have been successful, although short-lived, while others have failed and could not see the breaking of the next day. Reasons for the continued breaking of agreements between the two economies are found in the intrinsic nature of the hostilities that have existed between the two countries from the time of the Korean War. The countries constantly accuse each other of mistrust and thus see each other as a threat to the corporate security and existence of their states.

In response to North Korea's proliferation threats, the US has sought a number of policy measures, including military assistance with regional allies, broad sanctions, and nonproliferation procedures like export controls. In addition, the US pursued two significant diplomatic endeavors to persuade North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons program in exchange for help. Those discussions, however, broke down in 2009 due to differences about verification and a North Korean rocket launch that was denounced worldwide. Pyongyang has since claimed that it would never return to the negotiations and that the accords are no longer binding on it (Davenport, 2020).

The other five parties say they are still committed to the negotiations and want Pyongyang to stick to its 2005 vow of denuclearization. In January 2018, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that the country's nuclear arsenal was "complete and offered to negotiate North Korea's participation in the South Korean Olympics with Seoul. Kim Jong-un's sister was among the North Korean group at the Olympics, and she met with South Korean President Moon Jae-in. That encounter sparked a continuous inter-Korean dialogue, culminating in a summit between Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in April 27 that resulted in a proclamation addressing the common objective of Korean Peninsula denuclearization (Davenport, 2020).

Irrespective of the foregoing, the reason behind North Korea's refusal to concede to the biddings of the agreement has been another cause of continuous struggle between the both countries. According to Pembroke (2018), the primary problem to be settled at the June 12 summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and any following talks, is not North Korea's denuclearization, contrary to popular belief. Pyongyang's desire to dismantle its nuclear weapons is clearly apparent. However, it is unclear whether the US is willing to provide North Korea with the security assurances that it seeks. Pyongyang's nuclear weapons can be disabled and dismantled without a doubt. It's simply a matter of procedure. The United States has insisted on unilateral denuclearization with no reciprocal commitment. This implies that the United States on attempt to denuclearize North Korea, do not wish to recognize the national security of North Korea, because it fails to accord the same validity to the security concerns of north Korea, which exposes itself to moral censorship.

In the words of Pembroke (2018), North Korea began a new policy in the 1970s, which it has maintained ever since. It maintained, as it had in 1954, that a peace treaty was an unavoidable formality in achieving peninsula security. Pyongyang formally asked the US to enter

discussions for a peace deal to replace the armistice in a letter to the US Congress in 1974. In response to this request, neither the Nixon nor the Ford administrations took any action. Following that, North Korea's then-leader Kim Il-sung proposed a peace treaty to President Jimmy Carter, but nothing came of it. Despite the fact that Carter's program called for a reduction in US soldier levels in South Korea, the Pentagon successfully fought it. When Ronald Reagan took power in 1981, he raised the amount of US troops on the ground. He welcomed South Korea despite his intellectual opposition to a peace pact. George H W Bush, his successor, removed nuclear weapons from overseas deployments and decreased US force levels in South Korea slightly, but he did not seriously explore negotiating a peace deal (Pembroke, 2018).

In the light of Washington's repeated failures to bring peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula, Kim Jong-un policy towards the UN since assuming office in December 2011 is apparent, Despite the likelihood of sanctions, he escalated his country's nuclear testing and intercontinental ballistic missile launches, accompanied by increasingly frequent requests for a peace pact. Pyongyang issued at least five formal remarks between 2012 and 2016 emphasizing the need of concluding a peace deal. This method resulted in the North Korean regime's official position being communicated through the South Korean President's office on March 6. North Korea would have no incentive to preserve nuclear weapons if the military danger to the North was removed and its security assured. Therefore, North Korea increased its nuclear weapons production to respond to the threat in the Korean peninsula. It has an offer on the table and is bargaining from a strong position. President Trump needed to seize the chance to accomplish what his predecessors had failed to do, which is stopping the state of war, halt hostile conflict, and negotiate a peace treaty with North Korea (Pembroke, 2018).

Abduction of North Korean Vessel by United States and Failure to Reach Agreement in the Vietnam Summit

Based on the report by North Korea's KCNA news agency in 2019, the act of dispossession by the US has clearly revealed that the United States is really a gangster government that does not care at all about international rules. Pyongyang had denounced the seizure as an outright repudiation of the spirit of a declaration inked by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump at their first meeting last year in Singapore. The North Korean cargo ship was intercepted and impounded in American Samoa, according to the US Justice

Department. The ship was suspected of smuggling coal in breach of restrictions (Aijazeera, 2019).

In April 2018, the ship was initially seized by other foreign maritime officials in Indonesia. According to the Justice Department, the 17,000-tonne ship, which was also used to transfer heavy gear to North Korea, is one of the country's largest bulk carriers. This is the first time the United States has detained a North Korean cargo ship for breaking sanctions. The seizure occurred amid rising tensions following Pyongyang's recent military drills involving short-range missiles, as well as the standstill in nuclear talks since Trump and Kim's Hanoi meeting earlier this year. North Korea conducted further weapons tests this month, despite the fact that denuclearization discussions have stagnated. Kim's tests were interpreted as a protest after Trump turned down his request for sanctions relief at the Hanoi meeting. North Korea is sanctioned for its nuclear and missile Programmes by numerous UN Security Council resolutions, and removing some of the sanctions was a key demand from Pyongyang during the second Trump-Kim meeting in February, which ended without an agreement (Aljazeera, 2019).

The goal of the second US—North Korean meeting was to provide substance to the previous year's flimsy Singapore summit agreement. The Trump administration appeared to be indicating in the weeks leading up to the Hanoi meeting that it would lower the bar for North Korean activities and accept a deal that did not include total denuclearization (Klingner, 2019). The most authoritative and comprehensive explanation of the Administration's North Korea policy, Special Envoy Stephen Biegun's January 2019 speech, suggested greater receptivity to a peace declaration, accepting incremental steps toward denuclearization, stronger acceptance of the North Korean paradigm of parallel and simultaneous actions, and sanctions relief (U.S. Department of State, 2019).

The terms of a "small agreement" in which North Korea committed to suspend missile development at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and hand over more American military remains from the Korean War were reported in the media on the day of the Hanoi meeting. In return, Washington would sign a peace proclamation, open liaison offices in each other's capitals, and lift prohibitions on some inter-Korean commercial projects. On the other hand, North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, has now reintroduced the same nebulous idea that Biegun had already told his North Korean counterpart was unrealistic. The North Korean position is a very limited

concession, involving the Yongbyon complex, which has an outdated reactor and part of their uranium enrichment plutonium reprocessing capabilities (CNN News, 2019).

This was virtually the same plan that Kim's father and grandfather had presented for decades, and it would have been the regime's fifth attempt to reach an agreement with Yongbyon. Despite the fact that Yongbyon accounts for a large share of North Korea's fissile material output, there are additional hidden sites involved in uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons. Kim's offer did not involve destroying missile production sites or renouncing North Korea's nuclear, missile, and ballistic missile arsenals, as demanded by UN resolutions (CNN News, 2019). Pyongyang demanded the lifting of all United Nations economic restrictions imposed since 2016. North Korea's proposed sanctions relief was valued at many billions of dollars. However, the government was unwilling to impose a total halt on their weapons of mass destruction Programmes (U.S. Department of State 2019). President Trump challenged the North Koreans to go bigger in reaction to the dismal North Korean proposal (U.S. Department of State, 2019). In the words of Metz (2019), the Hanoi summit between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un enthralled the world. The first summit in 2018 between the two presidents in Singapore raised almost euphoric anticipation for an end to the US-North Korean antagonism, particularly in terms of addressing the most difficult subject of all: North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development. However, a genuine breakthrough in Vietnam has long looked elusive for one important reason: Americans struggle to comprehend Kim's worldview, preferring to approach him as they desire rather than as he is.

In this paper, we interrogated how United States Government sanctions against North Korea have undermined commitment of North Korea to the denuclearization summits' agreements. We went on to interrogate as well how the imposition of sanctions against individuals, companies & entities engaged in business with North Korea has engendered non-compliance of North Korea to the denuclearization agreement by the US. More so, explicit analysis was made on how the annulment of the US-NK summit agreements in 2018 by US & 29 other countries has contributed to the delay in denuclearization agreement implementation after meeting in Singapore. The chapter also examined how the abduction of North Korean vessel by US in May 2019 after the summit in Hanoi has facilitated the failure to reach any agreement in Hanoi summit in Vietnam. Based on our findings, we upheld our first hypothesis which states

that the continuous imposition of coordinated sanctions by Trump and Joe Biden Presidency against North Korea has undermined commitment of North Korea to the denuclearization summits' agreements.

Conclusion

Broadly, this study investigated the nexus between United States imposition of sanctions on North Korea and Conflict of Denuclearization Agenda. Specifically, the study pursued one objectives, which was to determine how the continuous imposition of coordinated sanctions by the Donald Trump and Joe Biden Presidency of the United States against North Korea undermined the adoption of a sustainable denuclearization agreement. On the hypothesis, we found that the continuous imposition of coordinated sanctions by the Donald Trump and Joe Biden Presidency against North Korea undermines the adoption of a sustainable denuclearization agreement. Sanctions were decided by the United States and also by the United Nations as instruments of punishment to North Korea for failing to agree to the denuclearization agreements over the years. Resulting from this unilateral resolution of the United States, there were impositions of sanctions on individuals and persons, who happen to be officials and administrators from North Korea, but domiciled in the United States. In the same vein, sanctions were also imposed on North Korean businesses and companies that have trans-border linkages with companies and individuals in the United States. These sanctions led to the reduction in the type, number, and nature of goods and services imported, exported, and rendered between the two countries and other countries of the United Nations as adopted by the United Nations Security Council. In the same vein, the annulment of the US-NK summit agreements in 2018 by US & 29 other countries was found to have led to delayed denuclearization agreement implementation after meeting in Singapore. The United States for so long has been perceived by North Korea as a deceptive State and this has drastically affected the trust level between the two countries. To this effect, North Korea proceeded with its nuclear program as United States has failed to keep to its side of the bargain and therefore projected the image of having other intentions after close door meetings between the two countries. Furthermore, when the U.S abducted the assumed vessel belonging to North Korea in May 2019 after the summit in Hanoi, the incidence became a precursor that soon facilitated the failure to reach any agreement in Hanoi, Vietnam summit between the two counties.

Therefore, the study evidently validated that the imposition of sanctions on North Korea by United States undermined the denuclearization agenda.

Recommendations

Arising from the above findings, therefore, the study puts forward the following recommendations for policy implementation:

1. The United States government should do well to lift the sanctions imposed on individuals and businesses connected to North Korea. The intensification of sanctions on individuals and businesses that has trans-border linkages with those in North Korea is rather not appropriate. The target of the United States is to denuclearize North Korea and not to punish the innocent citizens, which is against what the United Nations represents. This will further soften the heart of the North Korea leader and diplomats to return to a negotiation table with the United States.

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